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Federal Sentencing:
A Judge’s Personal Sentencing
Journey Told Through the Voices of
Offenders He Sentenced
Mark W. Bennett *
Abstract
Federal sentencing is a tragic mess. Thirty years of
conflicting legislative experiments began with high hopes but
resulted in mass incarceration. Federal sentences, especially in
drug cases, are all too often bone-crushingly severe.
In this Article, the Honorable Mark Bennett, a retired federal
judge, shares about his journey with federal sentencing and his
strong disagreement with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines by
telling the stories of some of the 400 men and women he sentenced
during his twenty-five years as a federal judge.
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I. Introduction
Federal sentencing is a tragic mess. Thirty years of
conflicting legislative experiments began with high hopes but
resulted in mass incarceration. 1 Federal sentences, especially in
drug cases, are all too often bone-crushingly severe. That is
especially true for most of the endless drug offenders I see:
non-violent, low-level, long-term and severe drug addicts. These
folks stand before me for sentencing in sharp contrast to the
super violent drug cartel kingpins we read about and see on
television, Netflix, and in the movies. 2
This Article reveals much of my journey through the arc of
federal sentencing. The reveal comes from the voices of the men
and women I have sentenced and the over four hundred I have
visited in federal prisons while I was a sitting federal district
judge for nearly a quarter century. 3 I retired on March 2, 2019.
1.
Paul Hofer, After Ten Years of Advisory Guidelines, and Thirty Years
of Mandatory Minimums, Federal Sentencing Still Needs Reform, 47 U. TOL.
L. REV. 649, 649 (2016).
2.
Mark W. Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration: A Federal Judge
Reveals Shocking Truths About Federal Sentencing and Fleeting Hopes for
Reform, 87 UMKC L. REV. 3, 3 (2018) [hereinafter Bennett, Addicted to
Incarceration].
3.
I first wrote about visiting offenders I had sentenced in 2011. See
Mark W. Bennett, Reflections on Visiting Federal Inmates, 94 JUDICATURE 304,
304–05 (2011) (reflecting on seven years of visiting inmates).
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Most of the names of the offenders in this Article are obscure
and little-known except by their families. Conversely, a few are
very well known for the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence their
cases generated. Many law review 4 and other articles and media
reports 5 have documented my opposition to the War on Drugs
4.
See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, A Judge’s Attempt at Sentencing
INCONSISTENCY After Booker: Judge (Ret.) Mark W. Bennett’s Guidelines
for Sentencing, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 243, 256–65 (2019) (explaining how federal
judges engage in district court activism to achieve criminal justice reform);
Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration, supra note 2, at 15–17, 20–22 (discussing
the current sentencing scheme prior to the First Step Act and several proposed
reforms); Mark W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut, Looking Criminal and the
Presumption of Dangerousness: Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, and
Criminal Justice, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 754, 780 (2018) (analyzing the
history and effects of Afrocentric facial feature bias in the criminal justice
system); Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging
Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 63, 106 (2017) (finding that both federal and state court trial judges have
greater anti-Jewish and anti-Asian implicit biases than members of the
general public and that the implicit biases affect the length of the sentence in
a white-collar sentencing scenario); Mark W. Bennett, Justin D. Levinson &
Koichi Hioki, Judging Federal White-Collar Fraud Sentencing: An Empirical
Study Revealing the Need for Further Reform, 102 IOWA L. REV. 939, 981 (2017)
(criticizing the fraud Guideline on numerous grounds); Mark W. Bennett, The
Implicit Racial Bias in Sentencing: The Next Frontier, 126 YALE L.J. F. 391,
392 (2017) (asserting that Afrocentric facial feature and skin tone biases are
the next frontier of racially biased sentencing); Mark W. Bennett, A Slow
Motion Lynching? The War on Drugs, Mass Incarceration, Doing Kimbrough
Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 873,
877 (2014) (discussing mass incarceration and the need for more federal judges
to express “policy” disagreements with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and
urging Congress towards sentencing reform); Mark Osler & Mark W. Bennett,
A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass Incarceration and the Role of
Discretion, 7 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 117, 121, 129, 137, 153, 163 (2014)
(discussing the rise of mass incarceration and the role of Congress, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, and federal judges in it and a path for reform); Mark
W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases
in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw,
104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495–96, 529 (2014) (explaining the
powerful cognitive “anchoring” effect of the federal sentencing guidelines
which leads to overly harsh sentences and suggesting a modest, simple, and
practical reform to reduce the anchoring effect).
5.
See, e.g., Mark Bennett & Mark Osler, The Wrong People Decide Who
Goes to Prison, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/12/03/opinion/bennett-oslersentencing/index.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2013, 7:49 AM) (last visited Mar.
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and my criticism of the bone-crushing severity of federal
sentencing, congressionally mandated mandatory minimums,
and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s federal sentencing
guidelines. Jessica Roth recently described my decision to speak
out about the unfairness of federal sentencing:
[S]ince at least 2012, Judge Bennett has written extensively
about the need to reform sentencing policy in a variety of
publications and has granted numerous interviews to
journalists. Acknowledging that “[f]ederal judges have a
longstanding culture of not speaking out on issues of public
concern,” he explained that he was “breaking with this
tradition” because the “daily grist” of unjust mandatory
minimum sentencing for non-violent drug offenders “compels
[him] to.” 6

28, 2020) (“[O]ur analysis of the way these enhancements have been used
reveals a deeply disturbing dirty little secret of federal sentencing: the
stunningly arbitrary application of these enhancements by prosecutors within
the Department of Justice.”) [https://perma.cc/YQL3-67FX]; Mark W. Bennett,
How Mandatory Minimums Forced Me to Send More Than 1,000 Nonviolent
Drug Offenders to Federal Prison, NATION (Oct. 24, 2012), https://
www.thenation.com/article/how-mandatory-minimums-forced-me-send-more1000-nonviolent-drug-offenders-federal-pri (last visited Mar. 28, 2020) (“If
lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug addicts actually
worked, one might be able to rationalize them. But there is no evidence that
they do.”) [https://perma.cc/JHK8-GMDW]; THE HOUSE I LIVE IN (BBC 2012)
(directing by Eugene Jarecki, the film was the Official Selection and Winner
of the Grand Jury Prize at Sundance Film Festival 2012); Eli Saslow, Against
His Better Judgment, WASH. POST, June 6, 2015, at A1 (“Bennett had often
viewed his job as less about presiding than abiding by dozens of mandatory
minimum sentences established by Congress in the late 1980s for federal
offenses.”).
6.
Jessica A. Roth, The “New” District Court Activism in Criminal
Justice Reform, 72 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 190 (2018). Professor Roth
uses the term “new” activism hesitantly because she recognizes the term
“activism” has “become little more than an epithet for describing judges and
decisions with which the speaker disagrees.” Id. at 190 (footnote omitted). She
uses the term for two reasons. First, it describes “an active and engaged
judicial posture rather than a passive, reactive one.” Id. (footnote omitted).
“Second, it taps into important debates about the proper role of the judge in
our democracy, debates that have not fully explored the hortatory and other
forms of judicial activity described in this Article.” Id. (footnote omitted).
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Many of my judicial decisions have reflected my strong
disagreement with many of the deeply flawed U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. 7
7.
See, e.g., United States v. Nawanna, 321 F. Supp. 3d 943, 952 (N.D.
Iowa 2018) (disagreeing with the methamphetamine Guidelines on policy
grounds because they are based on a flawed assumption that
methamphetamine purity is a proxy for role in the offense); United States v.
Feauto, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1040 (N.D. Iowa 2015) (concluding that a
direction to disregard or nullify a statutory mandatory minimum sentence
when resentencing a defendant, pursuant to Amendment 782 and policy
statement U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c), exceeds the Sentencing Commission’s
statutory authority and/or violates the non-delegation doctrine and the
separation-of-powers principle), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. In other
words, the authority to nullify mandatory minimums is not a power that the
Sentencing Commission could usurp or one that Congress could delegate). Id.
United States v. Koons, 850 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 1783
(2018); United States v. Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1023 (N.D. Iowa 2013)
(stating a policy disagreement with the methamphetamine quantity
Guidelines, which systemically overstate defendants’ culpability); United
States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (disagreeing
with the Career Offender Guideline when applied to a defendant, like
Newhouse, who is a nonviolent, recidivist drug addict occupying a low-level
role in the drug trade in order to obtain drugs for her addiction, but
recognizing that some offenders have earned Career Offender status and
should be sentenced within the Career Offender Guideline, and, in rare
instances, higher); United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 880 (N.D.
Iowa 2011) (rejecting the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines using the “new” 18:1
ratio, for the same reasons as the “old” 100:1 ratio and based on additional
concerns that they create a “double whammy” on crack defendants, penalizing
them once for the assumed presence of aggravating circumstances in crack
cocaine cases and again for the actual presence of such aggravating
circumstances in a particular case); United States v. Vandebrake, 771 F. Supp.
2d 961, 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (varying upward from the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines based on policy disagreements with the relatively lenient
treatment of antitrust violations when compared to fraud sentences), aff’d, 679
F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Golden, 679 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985
(N.D. Iowa) (reiterating rejection of the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio in
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, note 10, categorically, on policy grounds), aff’d, 394 F. App’x
347 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jacob, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1112 (N.D.
Iowa 2009) (reiterating categorical rejection, on policy grounds, of U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2, concerning sexual exploitation of a minor in the form of interstate
transportation of child pornography because it improperly skews sentences
upward); United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640–41 (N.D. Iowa 2009)
(rejecting the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio in the guidelines on policy grounds);
United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (N.D. Iowa 2009)
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I am a retired U.S. district judge who spent more than one
third of my life populating the Federal Bureau of Prisons. I
sentenced more than 4,000 offenders spanning twenty-four
years on the bench. I did this in five different districts—from
both districts in Iowa to the near farthest reaches of our federal
courts in the District of the Northern Mariana Islands. I
imposed sentences from probation (not often enough) to
affirming two juries’ verdicts to impose the federal death
penalty. 8 I also reviewed numerous state and federal sentences
as a district judge on habeas review. Finally, I sat by
designation numerous times on the courts of appeals, where I
reviewed federal sentences on direct appeal and federal and
state sentences on habeas review. Before that, I was in private
practice for seventeen years as a civil rights, civil liberties, and
criminal defense lawyer, almost exclusively in our federal
courts. Up to the day I retired as a federal judge, I was
passionate about judging and loved most of it. I even thought I
was at my very best in sentencing, but I have not missed it for
a second—except for the judges I was so exceptionally fortunate
to have as colleagues and the folks I worked with at the
courthouses in our district, especially our incredibly dedicated
U.S. probation officers.
I found the collective weight of so many sentencings more
emotionally draining and soul robbing than the deaths of my
son, all my siblings, and my parents. My decision to retire freed
me from being a cog in the nations’ machinery of injustice—
driven primarily by nonsensical and politically motivated
congressionally
mandatory
minimum
sentences
and
extraordinarily harsh federal sentencing guidelines. One of my
friends commented to me recently that he had not seen me so
(rejecting categorically, on policy grounds, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
child pornography cases).
8.
See United States v. Honken, 381 F. Supp. 2d 936, 1056 (N.D. Iowa
2005) (“The simply horrific nature of the murders, and the presence of very
strong aggravating factors and relatively weak mitigating factors, resulted in
the imposition of the death penalty for the murders of the two children.”);
United States v. Johnson, 239 F. Supp. 2d 924, 927 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (noting
that Johnson was sentenced to death for her involvement in the murder of five
witnesses to the drug-trafficking enterprise of Johnson’s boyfriend, Honken).
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happy since my days of practicing law. I am not asking for
sympathy, just understanding. Nobody forced me to take what
is considered one of finest legal jobs in the country, a job that
outsiders will mark as the pinnacle of the arc of my legal career.
This Article follows my presentation at the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 2019 Annual
Symposium: Issues in Federal Sentencing: Privilege, Disparity,
and a Way Forward. I know something of privilege—White
privilege—I have been the beneficiary of it all of my life. I grew
up in an upper-middle-class family in a White neighborhood in
St. Paul, Minnesota, with few wants. My elementary and junior
high school were one hundred percent White. Yet, my parents
were strong civil rights proponents and taught me that everyone
on life’s journey was a son or daughter of a higher being and
entitled to be treated with dignity and respect. They fought
innumerable battles for my younger brother, David, who was
born with severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy. I saw
warriors for justice first-hand. I lived with them and loved them
deeply. They have long since passed but they remain my role
models and heroes. The title of the panel I was on for the 2019
Annual Symposium included the phrase “Dignity in the
Courtroom.” That was my highest aspiration—not always
obtained—that offenders be treated with unparalleled dignity.
My steady stream of amazing law clerks often commented to me
in private that I was so tough on the lawyers but so passionate
and kind to the offenders.
From a macro lens, in addition to the severity of federal
sentencing, the racial disparity in federal sentencing is also
deeply troubling. A recent finding by the United States
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), utilizing sophisticated
multivariate regression analysis, found that “Black male
offenders continued to receive longer sentences than similarly
situated White male offenders.” 9 The Commission found that
9.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN
SENTENCING: AN UPDATE TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT 2 (2017), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2017/20171114_Demographics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J87CAYQF].

Bennett_Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

468

5/29/2020 3:59 PM

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 461 (2020)

“Black male offenders received sentences on average 19.1
percent longer than similarly situated White male offenders”
during fiscal years 2012 to 2016. 10 Male Hispanic offenders
received sentences that were 5.3 percent longer than White
male offenders during fiscal years 2012 to 2016. 11
The vignettes you are about to read are both real and
fictional. Real in the sense that everything you read actually
happened. Fictional in the sense that some of the names, places,
and voices are composites of real events in my nearly quarter
century of federal sentencing.
II. The Voices of Offenders I Have Sentenced
A. Anthony Jones
I only met Judge Bennett once back in the early 2000s when
I was serving a lengthy federal sentence for crack cocaine
distribution in the Kansas City area. I was imprisoned at the
Federal Bureau of Prisons facility, Terminal Island, in Long
Beach, California. Yeah, what a terrible name for a prison. It
was a routine day just like every other one and early in the
afternoon I got asked by the warden’s office if I was willing to
meet with a fellow who was touring the prison and wanted to
talk to a few inmates about life inside this joint. The warden’s
office said no staff would be present because the guy wanted our
straight scoop. I agreed and was taken to a small room where
two other inmates from different cell blocks were seated. I
recognized both, a Hispanic gang-banger from East L.A. with
prison tats over his entire body and face. I didn’t know his real
name, but his prison gang name was “El Salivotas” (the Drooler)
because part of his face was paralyzed in a prison knife fight.
The other guy was an Anglo meth dealer who goes by “L.A. Ice.”
I was the only Black con in the room. The door opened suddenly,
and this middle-aged, casually dressed Anglo walked in and
smiled and held out his hand to each of us to shake our hands
and said simply, “My name is Mark, and I am here to ask about
10.
11.

Id.
Id. at 8.
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your experiences with the federal criminal justice system and
your incarceration here at Terminal Island. May I sit down in
the empty chair? What are your names?” After we gave him our
names, he called each of us by our first name and asked that we
use his first name “Mark.” Then he said:
To make full disclosure, my name is Mark Bennett, and I am
a U.S. district judge from the Northern District of Iowa. I am
here for the sole purpose of asking each of you if you are
willing to help me become a better judge by sharing your
criminal justice and personal stories with me.

The next 90 minutes were gone in a flash. Judge Bennett
asked question after question about our lives growing up; any
role models in the community; early criminal activity; how we
got caught on our latest federal crime; what we thought of the
legal process, our defense lawyers, the prosecutors, the U.S.
probation officers, the sentencing judge, the length of our
sentences, safety and programming in Terminal Island; and our
hopes for the future. When Judge Bennett said it was time to
wrap up and for him to leave, I started sobbing, uncontrollably.
Judge Bennett placed his hand on my knee and asked in a soft
voice, “Tony, did I say something to upset you?” After I caught
my breath I was able to mumble, “No, it’s just in my wildest
dreams I never thought I would be in a small room with a federal
judge and that he would ask my opinions about things.”
As I left Terminal Island, my mind was swimming with
information from the inmates. That last contact with Tony and
his sobbing left an indelible impression on me and was mostly
what I was thinking about as I traveled back to Iowa the next
day. It was on that plane ride home that I decided visiting
offenders that I had sentenced would be an important piece of
gleaning a deeper understanding of the federal criminal justice
system. It was not until many years later, when I watched a
YouTube video by Bryan Stevenson, founder and executive
director of the Equal Justice Initiative, titled “The Power of
Proximity,” that I began to fully appreciate how and what the

Bennett_Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

470

5/29/2020 3:59 PM

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 461 (2020)

offenders taught me. 12 It was by being proximate with offenders
I had sentenced, in their environments, not mine, where my real
education took place.
B. David Johnson and Thirty or So Other Offenders at the
Federal Prison in Yankton, South Dakota
The federal prison camp in Yankton, South Dakota, was a
federal prison I liked to recommend to the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) for non-violent offenders serving a sentence of less than
120 months (requirements for admission). Not only was it the
closest federal prison to Iowa, but it had one of the largest
500-hour residential drug treatment programs in the BOP. All
of the offenders going through the drug treatment program lived
in the same cellblock for the length of the program.
My first visit there was shortly after my visit to Terminal
Island. I communicated with the warden to set up the visit. I
had read about the prison in Yankton and knew it was on the
site of a former private college that had gone bankrupt and,
ironically, whose president had gone to federal prison for fraud.
It was located in a very nice residential part of Yankton and
looked like dozens of other private colleges in small Midwestern
cities.
I saw lots of folks walking on campus, no perimeter fences
or guard towers like at Terminal Island. It was not until I drove
up to the entrance that I could see all the male inmates wore
brown, drab, identical prison clothing. While I was walking to
the building in which I had been told the warden’s office was, an
12.
See Fortune Magazine, The Power of Proximity: CEO Initiative 2018,
YOUTUBE (June 28, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RyAwZIHo4Y
(encouraging listeners to “get ‘proximate’ to suffering and understand the
nuanced experiences of those who suffer from and experience inequality”)
[https://perma.cc/8CE6-LVFU]. Stevenson believes that “if you are willing to
get closer to people who are suffering, you will find the power to change the
world.” Leandra Fernandez, Empathy and Social Justice: The Power of
Proximity in Improvement Science, CARNEGIE FOUND. ADVANCEMENT TEACHING
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.carnegiefoundation.org/blog/empathy-and-socialjustice-the-power-of-proximity-in-improvement-science/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2020) [https://perma.cc/V377-UQS7].
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old main type building, I was greeted by several inmates I
recognized, and we exchanged smiles. After a tour of the prison,
the warden took me to the drug treatment dorm, where I would
meet with inmates I had sentenced who were in the residential
drug treatment program. There were over thirty offenders in the
room when I entered. I had no prepared remarks, and I was
nervous not knowing what kind of reception I would receive. I
pride myself in getting anyone, including strangers, to engage
in conversation, but this was different, way different.
As I stood in the front of the room, I could not get any kind
of response from the offenders. So I asked point blank: “Why is
nobody speaking?” No one initially responded. Then an offender
I recognized, because I had recently sentenced him, David
Johnson, raised his hand and said: “Judge, ain’t you here to
raise our sentences? I got a lower sentence than I expected and
even lower than my worthless defense lawyer asked you for.”
That caught me off-guard because I had not anticipated it.
I assured the offenders, “I can neither raise nor lower your
sentences, and I am here to visit with you and find out how each
one of you is doing.” Once that was out of the way, the offenders
were incredibly curious and talkative. Curious as to why I was
there to meet with them and anxious to ask questions from
everything about my expectations for them on supervised
release (the relatively new name for what replaced parole) to
advice on parenting, job prospects when they are released, and
which programs to take at the prison.
I had many further visits to Yankton to meet with inmates
I had sentenced. We had far ranging discussions—less about
their cases and more about prison programs and the
expectations I, our probation officers, and other judges in our
district had for them and what is expected on supervised release
when they got out. I always mentioned that I was a parent and
how fulfilling that was for me. That generated most of my
discussion with the offenders about who to reconnect with—
family and especially children. Sadly, for between eight and ten
percent of the offenders visited in federal prisons, I was their
only visitor.
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C. Steven Spears
I am Steve Spears, and I was sentenced by Judge Bennett in
2005 for possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine. Judge
Bennett announced in my sentencing that he disagreed with the
U.S. Sentencing Guideline that treated one gram of crack as
equal to one hundred grams of powder cocaine. Under this 100:1
ratio, the U.S. Probation Office determined my original
guideline sentencing range was 324 to 405 months. Judge
Bennett rejected the 100:1 ratio and adopted a 20:1 ratio. Judge
Bennett indicated that this reduced my guideline range to 210 to
262 months. Because I also had a twenty-year mandatory
minimum sentence, Judge Bennett sentenced me to the minimum
he could: 240 months. It then gets complicated. This is what I
came to understand by reading the various court decisions that
followed and what was explained to me by my new lawyers. My
original lawyer didn’t even ask the judge to reduce my sentence
based on the 100:1 disparity; Judge Bennett did that on his own.
The Eighth Circuit, en banc, reversed Judge Bennett and
remanded my case for resentencing, holding that there was no
authority authorizing district courts to reject the 100:1 ratio and
use a different ratio in sentencing defendants for crack cocaine
offenses.” 13 My new lawyers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court
and it reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded it back to
them. 14 The Eighth Circuit again, en banc, reversed Judge
Bennett and remanded it back to him to resentence me to the
higher guideline range of 324 to 405. 15 I appealed again to the
13.
See United States v. Spears (Spears I), 469 F.3d 1166, 1173–74 (8th
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“The district court stated its sentencing decision was
based solely on the Perry rationale and the other § 3553(a) factors would be
considered only if the sentence was reversed on the 20:1 ratio.”).
14.
See Spears v. United States, 552 U.S. 1090, 1090 (2008) (vacating and
remanding in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), which
held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act did not require a 100:1 ratio application
during sentencing).
15.
See Spears v. United States (Spears II), 533 F.3d 715, 716 (8th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (“In Spears’s case, we did not need either to adopt or endorse
the proposition outlined in Gunter and now Kimbrough because the district
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U.S. Supreme Court, and they reversed the Eighth Circuit yet
again and confirmed that Judge Bennett had the right to
disagree with the 100:1 ratio and substitute a 20:1 ratio. 16 The
Supreme Court flatly rejected the Eight Circuit approach that
sentencing judges did not have the right to categorically reject
the 100:1 ratio and substitute their own ratio. 17 Now I get to
quote from a Supreme Court case that bears my name, Steven
Spears: “A sentencing judge who is given the power to reject the
disparity created by the crack-to-powder ratio must also possess
the power to apply a different ration which, in his judgment,
corrects the disparity.” 18 This reduced my sentence from the 324
to 405 months that the Eighth Circuit thought I deserved to the
240-month mandatory minimum that Judge Bennett gave me, a
reduction of more than ten years. Judge Bennett indicated at the
end of the sentencing that he would have gone lower had
Congress not handcuffed his discretion with this mandatory
minimum twenty-year sentence.
Shortly after the Spears Supreme Court decision, I reduced
the crack/powder ratio that I used in sentencing crack cocaine
offenders from the 20:1 ratio to a 1:1 ratio. 19 The Spears case
also reflected something I found deeply troubling as a federal
judge with a very heavy criminal caseload. I was often shocked
by the lack of quality representation by defense lawyers.
court did not just ‘consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of
crack and powder cocaine offenses.’”) (citation omitted).
16.
See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009) (“[T]he
District Court’s choice of replacement ratio was based upon two well-reasoned
decisions by other courts, which themselves reflected the Sentencing
Commission’s expert judgment that a 20:1 ratio would be appropriate in a
mine-run case.”).
17.
See id. at 265–66 (“[W]e now clarify that district courts are entitled
to reject and vary categorically from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a
policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”).
18.
Id. at 265.
19.
See United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (N.D. Iowa 2009)
(reporting my first decision adopting the 1:1 crack/powder sentencing ratio
and rejecting the 100:1 ratio on policy grounds).
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Because we were dealing with a person’s liberty, I would often
raise legal issues, including mitigating factors that the defense
failed to raise. I would give the parties an opportunity to discuss
them and grant a continuance if either lawyer wanted one. Way
too often I gave a sentence that was less than the defense lawyer
asked for. I was surprised to find so many walking violations of
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 20 On the other
hand, there were several truly amazing defense lawyers,
including some from the Federal Public Defender’s Office. I tried
as best I could to give what I thought was just sentence
regardless of the quality of counsel. The federal prosecutors who
came before me were very talented and exceptionally honest and
strait forward. We tangled often on legal issues and what a fair
sentence would be, but they were also often helpful in pointing
out how aggravating factors affected mitigation factors in the
difficult balancing act that is federal sentencing.
D. Demetrius Gully
I pled guilty without a plea agreement to four counts of
distributing crack cocaine arising from controlled buys. Using
the 100:1 federal sentencing advisory guideline range in effect at
the time of my sentencing, my guideline range was 108 to 135
months. If Judge Bennett could be persuaded to use a 1:1
crack/powder ratio, my guideline range would drop to 30 to 37
months. 21 The judge went farther than my defense lawyer argued
for and, on his own, decided to adopt a 1:1 crack/power ratio. 22
I thought that was awesome news till the judge finished with his
analysis of my sentencing. He started with the 1:1 crack/powder
20.
See, e.g., Spears I, 469 F.3d at 1169 (noting that my sentence was at
least a twenty-six percent decrease and at most a forty-one percent decrease
from what the g0uidelines required, and which defendant’s counsel did not
request).
21.
See Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (describing the effects of
aggravating and mitigating factors on the lowered—1:1—base offense level).
22.
See id. at 640–45 (highlighting the policy issues with the 100:1 crackto-powder ratio and the role the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Kimbrough
should have in untying the hands of federal judges at sentencing).
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ratio but then increased my sentence under what he referred to
as “the 3553(a) factors.” Bennett stated that my history of
assaultive behavior, including towards women; my continued
drug dealing while on pretrial release; that I was more than a
“street dealer” of crack; my repeated criminal conduct; and the
likelihood that I would reoffend justified a sentence of 84
months. 23 Still, I did better than the 100:1 ratio by twenty-four
months.
It made a lot of sense to me to use a 1:1 crack/powder ratio
and then increase the sentence if other factors like violence and
weapons were present. Data from the United States Sentencing
Commission indicate that such factors are more often present in
powder cases than crack cases. 24 But, at bottom they are not
present in a majority of the cases, so to use those factors to
justify a 100:1 ratio is like using a sledgehammer where a
scalpel will do. 25
E. Billy Williams
I was told by my defense lawyer that as the first offender to
be sentenced by Judge Bennett after the passage of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), 26 he did not know if the judge
23.
See id. at 646 (“[Given these aggravating factors,] a sentence of 84
months of incarceration—more than twice the upper end of his alternative
guideline range based on a 1:1 ratio—was sufficient, but not greater than
necessary in this case.”).
24.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 117 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites
/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks
/2018/2018-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf (noting that aggravating
factors caused an increase in 8.6% of powder cases and 5.9% of crack cases)
[https://perma.cc/5F8J-QTRP].
25.
See id. (noting that aggravating factors played no role in adjusting
federal sentences in 93% of all drug cases, 91.4% of powder cocaine cases, and
94.1% of crack cases).
26.
See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372,
2372–73 (reducing disparities in cocaine sentencing, eliminating mandatory
minimums for simple possession, increasing penalties for major drug
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would follow his prior 1:1 crack/powder ratio from the Gully
decision or follow the congressional mandate of the FSA, which
my lawyer told me reduced the 100:1 crack/powder ratio but
only to 18:1. As you all might expect, I was really nervous at my
sentencing. Judge Bennett said in my sentencing that he
assumed when he heard about the passage of the FSA that he
would be required to now use the 18:1 crack/powder ratio. 27 He
went on with a lengthy explanation, much of which I really did
not understand, until I had the time to study his complex written
decision that he was sticking to his guns on the 1:1 crack/powder
ratio. My favorite part of Judge Bennett’s sentencing opinion in
my case was his conclusion:
Make no mistake: I believe that the replacement of the 100:1
crack-to-powder ratio of the 1986 Act and associated
Sentencing Guidelines with the 18:1 crack-to-powder ratio of
the 2010 FSA and the November 1, 2010, amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines was a huge improvement, in terms of
fairness to crack defendants. While such incremental
improvement is often the nature of political progress on
difficult social justice issues—and, in this instance, the
increment is perhaps unusually large—an incremental
improvement is not enough to make me abdicate my duty to
“[c]ritically evaluat[e] the crack/cocaine ratio in terms of its
fealty to the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act.” See
Whigham, 754 F.Supp.2d at 247, 2010 WL 4959882 at *7.
traffickers, and emphasizing defendants’ role and behavior during commission
of drug offenses).
27.
In my sentencing opinion in Williams I wrote:
When I first learned that the 2010 FSA was about to be passed, I
just assumed that I would change my opinion from a 1:1 ratio to the
new 18:1 ratio, because I assumed that Congress would have had
persuasive evidence—or at least some empirical or other evidence—
before it as the basis to adopt that new ratio. I likewise assumed
that the Sentencing Commission would have brought its
institutional expertise and empirical evidence to bear, both in
advising Congress and in adopting crack cocaine Sentencing
Guidelines based on the 18:1 ratio. Failing that, I assumed that the
prosecution would present at the presentencing hearing in this case
some evidence supporting the 18:1 ratio.
United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849–50 (N.D. Iowa 2011).
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Performing that duty here, I must reject the Sentencing
Guidelines using the “new” 18:1 ratio, just as I rejected the
Sentencing Guidelines using the “old” 100:1 ratio, based on a
policy disagreement with those guidelines, even in “mine-run”
cases, such as this one. I must do so, because I find that the
“new” 18:1 guidelines still suffer from most or all of the same
injustices that plagued the 100:1 guidelines, including the
failure of the Sentencing Commission to exercise its
characteristic institutional role in developing the guidelines,
the lack of support for most of the assumptions that crack
cocaine involves greater harms than powder cocaine, the
improper use of the quantity ratio as a “proxy” for the
perceived greater harms of crack cocaine, and the disparate
impact of the ratio on Black offenders. I also find that the
“new” guidelines suffer from some additional concerns, in
that they now create a “double whammy” on crack defendants,
penalizing them once for the assumed presence of aggravating
circumstances in crack cocaine cases and again for the actual
presence of such aggravating circumstances in a particular
case.
In one respect the “new” 18:1 guideline ratio is more irrational
and pernicious than the original 100:1. When the 100:1 ratio
was enacted, Congress and the Sentencing Commission did
not have access to the overwhelming scientific evidence that
they now have. This overwhelming scientific evidence now
demonstrates that the difference between crack and powder is
like the difference between ice and water—or beer and wine.
Can anyone imagine a sentence that is many times harsher
for becoming legally intoxicated by drinking wine rather than
beer? Of course not. 28

I really did expect that the FSA’s new 18:1 ratio would be
based on empirical evidence that was not present or available
when the original 100:1 ratio was adopted. But that clearly was
not the case despite my efforts to give the United States an
opportunity to establish the empirical basis for the 18:1 ratio.
As I wrote in the Williams decision, the 18:1 ratio of the FSA

28.

Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92.
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was a disappointing political compromise. 29 Not disappointing
that it was a compromise, which I view as helpful in politics, but
disappointing because of the total lack of empirical evidence
that was readily available to Congress. Interestingly, after both
the Gully 30 and Williams 31 decisions, the government never
appealed any of my crack ratio sentences.
F. Lori Ann Newhouse
When I was sentenced in 2013 by Judge Bennett for
possession of twenty grams of methamphetamine, the PSR
(presentence report) classified me as a “Career Offender” under
the federal sentencing guidelines. 32 My lawyer explained to me
that this raised my federal sentencing guideline range from 70 to
87 months to what Judge Bennett described as “a staggering and
mind-numbing 262–327 months.” 33 The judge recognized that I
was a “low-level pill smurfer,” 34 that is someone who went to
various stores to gather precursor chemicals for someone to cook
meth. 35 In my case, I was smurfing pseudoephedrine pills used
in cough and cold remedy medications sold over-the-counter. 36

29.
See id. at 880 (“Not only was the 18:1 ratio . . . the product of political
compromise, not an authoritative rationale, it continued the same flaws that
were present in the 100:1 ratio in the 1986 Act.”).
30.
See Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (adopting the 1:1 crack/powder
sentencing ratio on an as-applied basis).
31.
See Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 853 (maintaining a 1:1 ratio in spite
of the unreasoned mandate of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to implement a
18:1 ratio).
32.
See United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (N.D. Iowa
2013) (noting that defendants with at least two previous drug or violent crime
convictions and sentences are statutorily classified as “career offenders” under
§ 4B1.1 of the FSA).
33.
Id. at 958.
34.
Id. at 957.
35.
See id. (citing Rob Bovett, Methamphetamine: Casting a Shadow
Across Disciplines and Jurisdictions, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1195, 1208 n.86 (2006)).
36.
See id. at n.2 (“In order to obtain sufficient quantities of
pseudoephedrine, methamphetamine manufacturers have increasingly
turned to pill smurfers to make multiple purchases of products containing
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The judge noted in his sentencing opinion that I “was just
one of thousands of ‘low hanging fruit’—non-violent drug addicts
captured by the War on Drugs and filling federal prisons far
beyond their capacity.” 37 The facts of my case were unusual. The
judge called me a “one-day” Career Offender because the
predicate crimes for me being a Career Offender occurred in 2002
when I was twenty-two. I was in a motel room with three others
when law enforcement found 3.29 grams of meth and 14.72
grams of psilocybin magic mushrooms. 38 I was sentenced to
probation in state court for these two charges, by the same judge,
but on different days. 39 Judge Bennett noted something that I
still find incredible:
For reasons unknown, but likely random, the local prosecutor
filed the two charges on separate days. Ironically, if the two
charges had been filed in the same charging document or the
defense lawyer, the prosecutor, the judge or the court
administer had scheduled the two sentencings for the same
day—Newhouse would not be a Career Offender. 40

Because of these weird facts, the judge analyzed the Career
Offender Guideline in great detail and stated his policy
disagreement with the Career Offender Guideline as applied to
my facts and varied downward to my mandatory minimum
sentence of 120 months. 41

pseudoephedrine from multiple stores—a process known in the
methamphetamine trade as ‘smurfing.’”).
37.
Id. at 958.
38.
See id. at 957 (“Newhouse was charged in state court and pled guilty
to possession with intent to deliver.”).
39.
See id. at 957–58 (sentencing by Chief Judge Arthur Gamble of the
Fifth Judicial District of Iowa).
40.
Id. at 958.
41.
See id. at 992 (reducing the sentence indicated under the Career
Offender Guidelines by 54.2 percent to 63.3 percent).
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I used the variance factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to
determine the final sentence. 42 I was especially concerned with
the flip-side of unwarranted sentencing disparity: unwarranted
sentencing uniformity—a problem that I find is both as
important as unwarranted sentencing disparity and so often
overlooked in federal sentencing. 43
G. Jason Pepper
Like Steven Spears’s, my sentencing by Judge Bennett went
to the U.S. Supreme Court. 44 My case is really complicated
procedurally. There are four Eighth Circuit reported decisions
referred to in my Supreme Court decision as Pepper I–Pepper
IV. 45 But cutting to the chase, my original federal sentencing
guideline range on my meth case was 97 to 121 months. 46 The
judge departed down to a sentence of two years. 47 In Pepper I, the
Eighth Circuit decided the judge had considered an
impermissible factor and reversed and ordered resentencing. 48 I
42.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (including nature and circumstances
of offense, defendant’s criminal history, and the purpose and desired effect of
the sentence on the offender).
43.
See United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 977–79 (N.D.
Iowa 2013) (noting that blindly applying sentencing uniformity to defendants
who are convicted of similar crimes without considering the mitigating and
aggravating factors of each case individually often results in sentencing
disparity).
44.
See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (“The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded in this case that the
District Court, when resentencing petitioner after his initial sentence had
been set aside on appeal, could not consider evidence of petitioner’s
rehabilitation since his initial sentencing.”).
45.
See id. at 482–86 (noting that the 8th Circuit decided Pepper I in 2005,
Pepper II in 2007, Pepper III in 2008, and Pepper IV in 2009).
46.
See United States v. Pepper, 412 F. 3d 995, 996 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the government filed a motion to have the range reduced given Pepper’s
informing on two other individuals involved with illegal drugs and weapons).
47.
See id. at 997 (granting the government’s motion).
48.
See id. at 999 (“[N]amely [the district court’s] desire to sentence Mr.
Pepper to the shortest possible term of imprisonment that would allow him to
participate in the intensive drug treatment program at the federal prison in
Yankton.”).
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was released from federal prison just three days after the
decision in Pepper I. 49 At the resentencing hearing before Judge
Bennett, I offered considerable testimony about my
rehabilitation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, this evidence
included that I had successfully completed the 500-hour drug
treatment program while in federal prison, that after my release
I enrolled as a full-time student in a community college and
earned straight A’s, that I obtained part-time employment a few
weeks after my release from prison and that I have maintained
this employment, and that I was in compliance with all my
conditions of supervised released. 50 My father also testified that
while he had no contact with me for five years prior to me going
to prison that he had re-established a relationship with me
because the drug treatment program in prison “sobered me up”
and made my way “of thinking change” and that I was “much
more mature” and “serious in terms of planning for the future.” 51
Finally, my U.S. probation officer testified that a sentence of
twenty-four months was reasonable and that I was at a low risk
of re-offending and also prepared a sentencing memo with
further reasons supporting the twenty-four month sentence. 52
Based on this evidence, Judge Bennett again gave me a
sentence of twenty-four months, based in large part on my
post-sentencing rehabilitation. 53 The government again
appealed, and the Eighth Circuit again reversed, holding that
49.
See Pepper, 562 U.S. at 482 (beginning supervised release
immediately after).
50.
See id. at 482
[M]y life was basically headed to either where—I guess where I
ended up, in prison, or death. Now I have some optimism about my
life, about what I can do with my life. I’m glad that I got this chance
to try again I guess you could say at a decent life . . . My life was
going nowhere before, and I think that it’s going somewhere now.
51.
See id. at 482–83 (“[A]nd that as a consequence, he had reestablished
a relationship with his son.”) (citations omitted).
52.
See id. at 483 (noting also that Pepper’s substantial assistance to law
enforcement was of great import).
53.
See id. (“[C]oncluding that ‘it would [not] advance any purpose of
federal sentencing policy or any other policy behind the federal sentencing
guidelines to send this defendant back to prison.’”).
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post-sentencing rehabilitation was “an impermissible factor to
consider in granting a downward variance.” 54 After my first
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and another reversal of the
Eighth Circuit, my second appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court
resulted in the landmark holding that post-sentencing
rehabilitation may, in appropriate cases like mine, support a
downward variance from the federal sentencing guideline
range. 55
On his final resentencing, Jason Pepper was sentenced to
time served by another judge in our district after I stated on the
record in my last resentencing of Mr. Pepper that my oath of
office did not allow me to give a greater sentence than the
twenty-four months. 56
H. Willie Hayes
I was a low level, non-violent addict meth dealer sentenced
by Judge Bennett. My lawyer pointed out in a sentencing
memorandum that the meth guidelines had increased from their
original range of 46 to 57 months—had I been sentenced back in
1987 when the guidelines were first promulgated—to 168 to 210
months, a staggering 360 percent increase. 57 My lawyer argued
that the drug guidelines should be given less deference than other
54.
See id. (affirming the downward departure for the defendant’s
substantial assistance but rejecting the additional downward departure for his
post-sentencing rehabilitation).
55.
Cf. id. at 504 (highlighting U.S. Supreme Court precedent that
allowed for increases in sentencing based on the offenders conduct
immediately following his or her original sentencing).
56.
See THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON, SIGMUND G. POPKO, DEBORAH YOUNG,
MICHAEL P. O’CONNOR & CELIA M. RUMANN, FED. SENT’G L. & PRAC., § 11.9.3
n.22 (2020 ed.) (stating that Pepper’s time-served sentence on remand was
reported in a legal blog from the Iowa Public Defender Office).
57.
See United States v. Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1012 (N.D. Iowa
2013) (arguing that the Sentencing Commission strayed from its institutional
role and drafted a particular guideline that failed to promote the sentencing
goals of the Fair Sentencing Act).
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guidelines because they were not crafted based on empirical
evidence or the institutional expertise of the United States
Sentencing Commission. 58 After a lengthy discussion of the meth
guideline, the judge noted the guideline was “deeply flawed” and
that he had a strong policy disagreement with it. 59 He decided
the remedy was to slash the meth guideline by one third in my
case and all future meth cases. 60
I wrote that the “Guidelines were intended to be
evolutionary in nature, and policy disagreements provide a
valuable function in the process of constantly improving
them.” 61 After lawyers seized on my Hayes decision and argued
it even for high-level major drug sellers, including violent ones
who were not addicts but sold drugs for greed, I limited it for the
most part to low-level, non-violent drug addicts. These were the
vast majority of drug offenders I sentenced.
I. Brandon Beiermann
Perhaps I am near to last in this Article because my crime is
often considered one of the most reprehensible by the public and
the criminal justice system, both the folks who work in the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, and other inmates. As Judge Bennett
noted in his opinion, I was the first Eagle Scout he sentenced,
and I had no prior criminal record. 62 I was charged with and
58.
See id. (“Hayes asserts that the methamphetamine Guidelines fail to
promote the goals of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because they have a
strong potential to overstate the seriousness of a defendant’s record and risk
of reoffending, resulting in unwarranted sentencing disparities.”).
59.
See id. at 1031–33 (applying a three-step 8th Circuit methodology for
recalculating sentencing ranges in light of conflicts with public policy).
60.
See id. at 1031 (“[A]fter reducing the Guidelines range by one third to
account for my policy disagreement, I will reserve the ability to adjust the
figure upwards and downwards as I weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”).
61.
Id. at 1031.
62.
See United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1090 (N.D.
Iowa 2009) (“This case raises the question of the merits of the advisory United
States Sentencing Guideline for defendants convicted of child pornography
offenses . . . .”).
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convicted of three counts of possessing, receiving, and sending on
my computer to others images of child pornography. 63
I had graduated from high school and was happily married
with two children. I had been sexually abused by a relative when
I was six and seven years old. I was never involved in “hands-on”
impermissibly touching a child or teenager. I lived in a small
town and considered myself to be a loner. Judge Bennett insisted
that before he could sentence me, he wanted an expert
psychologist to evaluate me for purposes of testifying at trial,
including a risk assessment of the likelihood of further sex
crimes. 64
The expert psychologist testified in my contested sentencing
hearing based on his own evaluation and a prior one that I had
from Catholic Charities. The expert testified that I did not pose
a serious risk of sexual violence but would benefit from
participation in a sex offender treatment program. 65
My advisory federal sentencing guideline range was 210 to
262 months. As the judge wrote in his opinion, this guideline
range substantially exceeded both the mandatory minimum of
sixty months and, at the top of the range, exceeded even the
statutory maximum, which would be illegal for a judge to
impose. 66 The judge even pointed out that the maximum possible
sentence on count 3, ten years’ incarceration, was irrationally
and grossly exceeded by the guideline range of 210 to 262. 67 Of
course, I could not be sentenced above a statutory maximum on

63.
See id. at 1091 (charging for conduct that occurred between
September of 2005 through January 11, 2006).
64.
See id. at 1091–94 (disallowing the prosecutor from interviewing or
even speaking with the psychologist prior to sentencing or calling the expert
as a witness during the sentencing hearing).
65.
See id. at 1094 (“[H]is understanding of his offense is limited and his
social skills are such that he is likely to benefit from referral to such a
program.”).
66.
See id. at 1098 (violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1)–(2)).
67.
See id. at 1097 (indicating that this range was calculated after
accounting for aggravating and mitigating factors).
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any count. My statutory maximum on counts 1 and 2 was twenty
years, somewhere in the middle of my sentencing range. 68
Judge Bennett joined an increasing cadre of federal
sentencing judges who had strong policy disagreements with the
harshness of the guidelines. 69 His opinion discusses the myriad
of factors that judges should consider in cases like mine: whether
the guideline is based on empirical research or evidence, the
degree of deference to give this advisory guideline, the extensive
reasons for the judge’s categorical rejection on policy grounds of
the guideline, the consideration of all the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors as well as the parsimony clause of § 3553. 70 After
factoring in all this information, Judge Bennett imposed a
sentence of ninety months followed by ten years of supervised
release with many restrictive conditions of supervised release. 71
Beiermann was one of the early child porn offenders I
sentenced. Towards the end of my judicial career of populating
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, I would have substantially
reduced Beiermann to closer to, if not at, the sixty-month
mandatory minimum but increased his term of supervised
release. This would have reduced the harshness of his sentence
yet given the criminal justice system many years to ensure
Beirmann did not reoffend—and if he did, then treat him more
harshly by invocating progressive discipline. Much empirical
work needs to be done to verify if progressive discipline is truly
evidence based and if there is a better approach to repeat
offenders on supervised release.

68.
See id. at 1098 (falling between the prescribed range of 17.5 years and
21.8 years).
69.
See id. at 1100 (citing federal district courts in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin).
70.
See id. at 1097–117 (including the need to avoid sentencing
disparities and to provide restitution to victims).
71.
See id. at 1117 (basing the sentence on limited precedent and the
avoidance of both unwanted sentencing disparities and inapplicable
sentencing similarities).
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J. Hector Rodriguez
I am Hector Rodriguez. In 2014, after serving forty-eight
months in federal prison I ran into my sentencing judge, Judge
Mark W. Bennett, at a local Walmart in Sioux City, Iowa, on a
busy Saturday afternoon. When I saw him in an aisle, I ran up
to him and asked if he was Judge Bennett. He said “Yes,” and I
introduced myself as a person he had sentenced and reached out
my hand to shake his. He warmly shook my hand with both his
hands and asked, “Hector, what did I sentence you for and for
how long, and how long have you been out?” I responded: “You
gave me forty-eight months for a drug conspiracy case, but the
prosecutors had asked for 150 months. I have been out for four
years and successfully completed my thirty-six months of
supervised release without a problem.” Judge Bennett
congratulated me on my success. I told him,
It meant a lot to me when you came and visited me in federal
prison to see how I was doing and actually sat next to me
during the noon meal and asked all about my family. At the
time I was shocked to see you. After you left, I knew I was not
going to disappoint you when I got out. Judge Bennett, my
wife and two daughters are in the aisle looking at pots and
pans, would you wait here while I get them, I would love for
them to meet you?

Judge Bennett said, “I would be honored to meet your
family, Hector.” He then met my family and gave my wife and
daughters big hugs and told them how important their support
for me was in my rehabilitation and my becoming a productive
member of society. He also told them how “proud he was of me
and that my family and I should hang our heads high because I
had not only paid my debt to society but was now a very
productive and important member of society.” We all parted ways
with tears of joy in our eyes. When Judge Bennett had sentenced
me years earlier I was stunned when at the end of the sentencing,
he came off the bench, walked over to where I had been sitting
next to my defense counsel, and shook my hand. I was in leg and
arm irons, so it was difficult but he did shake my hand. He said
in a soft voice: “Hector, you are a good man, father, and
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husband, who made some very bad choices. I hope you will take
advantage of the educational and work skills classes in prison
and become the productive member of society that your family
and I hope you can be.” He then turned to walk back to his
chambers. My defense lawyer told me that he forgot to tell me
Judge Bennett usually does this. He wants to say something
positive as the last person in the free world I would see for many
years, my lawyer explained. It was something about the judge’s
humanity I will never forget.
One of the most fulfilling parts of my federal judgeship,
especially in a small town of 85,000 was the fact that I
frequently ran into offenders I had sentenced and/or members
of their families. They were most always extremely polite.
Often, when I ran into family members of an offender who was
still incarcerated, they had questions about the sentence, even
if they had been at the sentencing. I greatly enjoyed the
opportunity to arrange a meeting with them in my chambers or
at a coffee house, donut shop, etc., to go over in detail the
presentence report and my statement of reason for the sentence
I gave. I answered all their questions, and they left with a much
greater understanding of the harshness of federal sentencing
when my hands were tied by the prior mandatory nature of the
guidelines and the bone-crushing mandatory minimum
sentences, even after the guidelines became advisory. As a
public servant I viewed this as an important part of increasing
public confidence in both the federal judiciary and the criminal
justice system. If I sensed an interest, I also discussed with them
actions they could take to help with criminal justice reform.
III. Conclusion
I have previously written that federal judges are addicted
to lengthy incarceration. 72 There are many reasons for this.
That needs to change. If I were anointed King of Federal
72.
See Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration, supra note 2, at 4 (resulting
in overcrowded federal prisons).
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Sentencing for a Day, my first act would be to slash the existing
federal sentencing guideline ranges by fifty percent or some
other percentage a Commission—made up of progressive judges
and experts on penology—would suggest. I suggest a fifty
percent reduction because no one disputes that the original U.S.
Sentencing Commission, when reviewing 10,000 pre-sentence
reports to calculate the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, ignored all
cases where offenders received probation, which accounted for
nearly fifty percent of the sentences across all case types
reviewed. 73
My second reform as king would be to abolish all mandatory
minimums in drug cases and most other criminal cases. Federal
judges know when an offender deserves a very long sentence,
usually to protect the public from that offender.
Another recommendation I have is to strongly encourage
federal judges to meet with offenders they have sentenced.
Judge Stephen R. Bough from the Western District of Missouri
has written an exceptionally powerful piece, Getting to Know a
Felon. 74 Every federal judge and any academics or students
interested in criminal justice reform should read Judge Bough’s
article. Truly getting proximate with offenders I had sentenced
by visiting them in their prisons had more impact on my
sentencing philosophy than all of the many thousands of
Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and district court sentencing
decisions and scholarly articles I have read.
Both the United States Sentencing Commission and
Congress should have many sessions with both current and
former federal offenders to brainstorm about criminal justice
reforms.
Finally, both the United States Sentencing Commission
and Congress should invite the leading criminal justice scholars
and experts, especially those who have worked with exciting
criminal justice reforms in the states and done empirical studies
73.
See id. at 17–20 (stating that the Commission gave no reason for why
it excluded probation sentences from its calculations).
74.
See Stephen R. Bough, Getting to Know a Felon, 87 UMKC L. REV. 25,
26–29 (2018) (using vignettes to illuminate the benefits of federal judges’
learning the stories of convicted felons).
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to see what evidence-based practices the federal criminal justice
system should adopt.
No article on federal sentencing reform should be published
without thanking the incredibly talented and diligent U.S.
probation officers who advise U.S. magistrate judges on pretrial
release or detention, supervise defendants on pretrial release,
draft amazingly thorough and comprehensive presentence
reports for district judges, and supervise offenders on release
after their prison terms expire. Federal probation officers are
the true unsung heroes of the federal criminal justice system.
My reform efforts would not have been possible without their
many discussions with me about the fairness of federal
sentencing.

